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 NOTE 
A Light at the End of the Tunnell?: The 
Parameters of Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
in Wrongful Death Cases 
Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 439 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
EDWARD WITTRIG* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
From its inception in 1967, the Missouri Uninsured Motorist statute1 has 
prompted continual and substantial litigation in an attempt for both insurers 
and their insureds to determine the statute’s proper application and scope.2  
At its core, the statute states that any automobile liability policy must contain 
a provision that extends a minimum amount of coverage to the insured in the 
 
* B.A., University of Illinois, 2010; M.S., Illinois State University, 2012; J.D. Candi-
date, University of Missouri School of Law, 2016; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Mis-
souri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I am grateful to Professor Angela Drake for her sug-
gestions throughout the writing process, the members of the Missouri Law Review for 
their time and edits, and my family for their support. 
 1. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (2000).  This statute states in part: 
 
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for 
delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principal-
ly garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental 
thereto, or in the case of any commercial motor vehicle, as defined in section 
301.010, any employer having a fleet of five or more passenger vehicles, such 
coverage is offered therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits 
for bodily injury or death set forth in section 303.030, for the protection of 
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from 
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.  Such legal entitle-
ment exists although the identity of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle 
cannot be established because such owner or operator and the motor vehicle 
departed the scene of the occurrence occasioning such bodily injury, sickness 
or disease, including death, before identification.  It also exists whether or not 
physical contact was made between the uninsured motor vehicle and the in-
sured or the insured’s motor vehicle. 
 
Id. 
 2. See Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 
S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
1
Wittrig: A Light at the End of the Tunnell?
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
922 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
event of injuries resulting from acts by uninsured motorists.3  Thus, the stat-
ute demands that automobile liability policies protect an insured when he or 
she sustains certain damages that were caused by a legally responsible, yet 
uninsured, motorist.4  Beyond demanding uninsured motorist (“UM”) cover-
age in each automobile liability policy, however, the UM statute is largely 
silent on the exact nature of the requirements of the mandated UM coverage, 
permissible provisions, allowable exclusions, and, in general, the intended 
scope of UM coverage in the respective policies.5 
As a result, the implementation, application, and interpretation of this 
important piece of legislation has been left largely to the providence of the 
Missouri judicial system.6  When faced with litigation surrounding the UM 
statute, Missouri courts have often broadly interpreted the statute,7 extending 
its coverage to a large class of insureds as well as increasing the maximum 
amount of recovery possible.8  Additionally, insurers have often struggled to 
obtain favorable decisions in Missouri courts, especially in cases appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Missouri,9 and have failed to establish a concrete 
boundary that limits the scope and extent of UM coverage.  Despite this ten-
dency to define the coverage required by the UM statute broadly, some Mis-
 
 3. § 379.203.1; Ezell v. Columbia Ins. Co., 942 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 4. Weinberg v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 659 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1983). 
 5. See Gibbs v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 938 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating that the UM statute does not provide a definition of the term “operator”); Fred 
Davis, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Some Significant Problems and Developments, 
42 MO. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977). 
 6. Davis, supra note 5, at *4. 
 7. It is important to remember, however, that these cases interpreting and em-
ploying Missouri’s UM statute only provide general principles to apply to any of the 
insurance policies in question.  Cases interpreting insurance provisions are highly 
dependent on the specific language used by the policy at issue as well as the specific 
circumstances of the case.  See generally Dibben v. Shelter Ins. Co., 261 S.W.3d 553, 
556 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (declaring that one has to read the policy as a whole in order 
to determine its meaning).  Thus, even though these cases evidence the approach 
Missouri courts take in considering UM provisions in insurance policies, it is im-
portant to remember and appreciate that the specific language used in the provision 
and the applicability of relevant exclusions and exceptions will dictate the outcome of 
the case.  However, if the language of the policy violates the clear provisions of the 
statute, the statute will invalidate the language of the policy.  See Derousse v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 8. See Shepherd v. Am. States Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); 
Hines v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Cameron Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976) (en banc); Galloway v. Farmers Ins. 
Co., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. App. W.D. 1975). 
 9. Scott Lauck, Insurers Rarely Sure of Victory, MO. LAWYERS MEDIA at *1 
(Feb. 23, 2013), http://molawyersmedia.com/blog/2013/02/23/insurers-rarely-sure-of-
victory/. 
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souri courts have imposed limits on the reach of the statute.10  In this murky 
atmosphere regarding the UM statute, the Supreme Court of Missouri decided 
Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.11 
Decisions, such as Floyd-Tunnell, that interpret UM coverage are be-
coming increasingly important as the cost of injuries12 in automobile acci-
dents, as well as the population of uninsured drivers, increase.13  Because 
uninsured drivers comprise a significant portion of the driving pool in each 
state,14 the issue of who qualifies as an insured in UM provisions can often 
determine whether a claimant is actually able to recover any damages for the 
injuries sustained in a car accident for which the claimant is not at fault.  Ju-
dicial decisions that act to extend or limit the application of a policy’s UM 
coverage also have real consequences beyond determining the extent, if any, 
of possible recovery for individual claimants, as these decisions determine the 
future costs of premiums as well as future policy language and provisions 
across the state.  After reviewing the relevant case law surrounding the UM 
statute, this Note will examine the greater ramifications of the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s decision to limit UM coverage in wrongful death cases to the 
damages sustained by the insured decedent, rather than for injuries that a co-
insured personally endured. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
The instant case was the product of a car accident that occurred when a 
vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist negligently crossed the centerline of 
Missouri State Highway 38 in Dallas County and struck a Chevrolet Cavalier 
 
 10. Livingston v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 11. Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
 12. For more information on the average costs of automobile accidents of vary-
ing degrees of severity, see the National Safety Council’s website.  Safety on the 
Road, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, http://www.nsc.org/Pages/nsc-on-the-road.aspx (last 
visited June 22, 2015). 
 13. Linda Russell, Uninsured Drivers are Growing Dangers on Missouri Road-
ways, KY3 (Sept. 13, 2011), http://articles.ky3.com/2011-09-13/uninsured-
drivers_30147391; Recession Marked by Bump in Uninsured Motorists, THE 
INSTITUTES (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.insurance-research.org/sites/default/files/ 
downloads/ IRCUM2011_042111.pdf (linking the recent increases in uninsured mo-
torists with the latest downturn in the economy as well as charting the percent of 
uninsured motorists by state). 
 14. Larry Copeland, One in Seven Drivers Have No Insurance, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 12, 2011 5:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-
09-11/uninsured-drivers/50363390/1; Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INSTITUTE, 
http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/uninsured-motorists (last visited June 22, 2015). 
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that was driven by Jerry Floyd.15  As a result of the head-on collision, Mr. 
Floyd sustained substantial injuries and was pronounced dead at the scene.16  
Mr. Floyd and his wife, Doris Floyd, had purchased three separate automo-
bile insurance policies from Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”) 
prior to the accident.17  One of the policies was issued for the Chevrolet 
Cavalier that was involved in the accident, while the other two policies in-
sured the Floyd’s Chevrolet Silverado and Toyota Camry, respectively.18 
As required by Missouri law,19 each of the Floyds’ insurance policies 
contained a provision that allowed coverage for accidents involving unin-
sured motorists.20  Each of these respective policies contained the same lan-
guage and identical provisions regarding UM coverage.  Specifically, each of 
the policies stated that in a collision where an uninsured motor vehicle is le-
gally responsible for the accident and liable for damages sustained by the 
insured, the insurance company “will pay the uncompensated damages; but 
this agreement is subject to all conditions, exclusions, and limitations of [its] 
liability.”21 
Additionally, each policy in its declarations page stipulated that UM 
coverage was limited to $100,000 per person.22  Finally, the policies con-
tained an “owned-vehicle” exclusion.23  This exclusion capped the insurance 
company’s maximum liability under any individual policy at $25,00024 in the 
event that the insured was injured while driving or operating a vehicle that 
was not covered by that specific policy, but was still owned by the insured at 
the time of the claim or covered under a different policy.25 
After the accident, Mrs. Floyd filed a claim seeking a total of $300,000, 
which included the $100,000 limit from each of the separate policies.26  
 
 15. Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., No. WD 75725, 2013 WL 5978452 
at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2013), transferred to 439 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
 16. Lauren Matter, Marshfield Man Dies in Dallas County, MO Car Crash, 
KSPR (Oct. 9, 2011), http://articles.kspr.com/2011-10-09/dallas-county_30261805; 
Paula Morehouse, Head-on Crash Kills Man From Marshfield, KY3 (Oct. 9, 2011), 
http://articles.ky3.com/2011-10-09/marshfield_30261801. 
 17. Floyd-Tunnell, 2013 WL 5978452 at *1. 
 18. Id. 
 19. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (2000). 
 20. Floyd-Tunnell, 2013 WL 5978452 at *1. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
 23. Id.  For more information on “owned-vehicle” exclusions, see generally, 
Janet Jones, Annotation, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Validity of Exclusion of Inju-
ries Sustained by Insured while Occupying “Owned” Vehicle Not Insured by Policy, 
30 A.L.R.4th 172 (1984). 
 24. $25,000 is the minimum statutory requirement in Missouri for UM coverage.  
MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1; MO. REV. STAT. § 303.030.5 (2000). 
 25. Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 217. 
 26. Id. 
4
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However, Shelter agreed to pay only $150,000 out of the requested amount, 
asserting that the “owned-vehicle” exclusion applied to the policies of the 
Floyds’ Silverado and Camry.27  Because Mr. Floyd was injured while driv-
ing an owned vehicle that was not covered under the Silverado and Camry 
policies, Shelter argued that the maximum recovery under the Silverado and 
Camry plans was $25,000 for each of these two policies.28  Both parties 
agreed that Mrs. Floyd was owed the $100,000 limit for the policy that cov-
ered the Chevrolet Cavalier that Mr. Floyd was operating at the time of the 
accident because the amount of damages sustained as a result of Mr. Floyd’s 
wrongful death exceeded the $100,000 policy limit.29 
In order to collect the outstanding $150,000 that she believed was due, 
Mrs. Floyd and her daughter, Rebecca Floyd-Tunnell, filed suit against Shel-
ter, seeking monetary compensation for the outstanding claim, attorney’s 
fees, and penalty fees against Shelter for vexatious refusal to pay.30  Subse-
quently, both Mrs. Floyd and Shelter moved for summary judgment on the 
claim.31  The Floyds contended that as a named insured, Mrs. Floyd suffered 
a distinct injury as a result of her husband’s death. Therefore, the owned-
vehicle exclusion would not apply to Mrs. Floyd, as she was not operating a 
vehicle at the time of the accident.32  Further, Mrs. Floyd argued that the 
owned-vehicle exclusion in the policy itself was vague and ambiguous and 
should be construed against the insurance company.33 
In contrast, Shelter asserted that the exclusion was clearly applicable 
under the circumstances because Mr. Floyd was the insured that suffered the 
injury.  As Mr. Floyd suffered the injury, the owned-vehicle exclusion ap-
plied for the policies for the Silverado and Camry.34  Therefore, Mrs. Floyd 
was necessarily limited to recover $25,000 from each of those two policies 
and could only receive a total of $50,000 from these two insurance contracts. 
The trial court found in favor of Shelter, specifically finding that the 
“owned-vehicle” provision applied.35  Plaintiffs appealed the trial court rul-
ing.36  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District first deter-
mined that Mr. Floyd, and not his wife, was the insured that suffered com-
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  Plaintiffs’ petition sought relief under MO. REV. STAT. § 375.420 (2000), 
which is the vexatious refusal to pay statute for Missouri.  Appellant’s Substitute 
Brief at 11, Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d 215 (No. S.C. 93904), 2014 WL 1317994.  As 
such, the petition necessarily did not seek punitive damages for the conduct of the 
insurance company in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim.  See § 375.420. 
 31. Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 217. 
 32. Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., No. WD 75725, 2013 WL 5978452 
at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2013). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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pensable damages under the terms of the policy.37  The court reached this 
determination by stating that even though a Missouri statute38 authorized Mrs. 
Floyd to bring the wrongful death action, Mr. Floyd was the person who suf-
fered damages under the definitions supplied by the insurance contract when 
it was considered in its entirety.39  Thus, Mr. Floyd, and not his wife, was the 
named insured for purposes of recovering damages, and the owned-vehicle 
exclusion would apply to the Silverado and Camry policies because Mr. 
Floyd was injured in an owned car not covered by those two policies.40 
Additionally, the court rejected the Floyds’ claim that Mrs. Floyd was 
the damaged insured, stating that this exceeded the normal and reasonable 
expectations of the average insured entering into an insurance contract.41  
Finally, the court rejected the Floyds’ claim that the policies were ambiguous 
due to the fact that the owned-vehicle exclusion deprived the insureds of 
some of the coverage granted to them on the declarations page, and that any 
restrictions to the limits delineated on the declarations page did not extend to 
the owned-vehicle exclusion.42  The court disagreed with the Floyds’ inter-
pretation, determining that when the insurance contract is read as a whole and 
proper consideration is given to all the terms, “[T]he partial exclusion to UM 
coverage is not susceptible to different interpretations and does not cause the 
meaning of the policies to be uncertain.”43  Therefore, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Western District affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the sum-
mary judgment motion in favor of Shelter.44  Mrs. Floyd and her daughter 
appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Missouri.45 
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the decision of the court of 
appeals, holding that Mrs. Floyd could not recover under the policies on her 
own behalf apart from the damages owed to her husband due to his injuries.46  
In so reasoning, the court stated that “[i]t would be unreasonable to interpret 
section 379.203 to require every automobile liability insurance policy to pro-
vide coverage for damages its insureds are legally entitled to recover for the 
wrongful death of another person.”47  Thus, the court held that UM coverage 
does not allow the insured to recover on his or her own behalf for damages 
sustained by the wrongful death of another co-insured, but rather limits re-
 
 37. Id. at *4. 
 38. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080.1(1) (2000). 
 39. Floyd-Tunnell, 2013 WL 5978452, at *4–5. 
 40. Id. at *4. 
 41. Id. at *5. 
 42. Id. at *7. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *8. 
 45. Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 216 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 220. 
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covery for the insured to damages collected as a beneficiary of the wrongful 
death claim.48 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Origins of UM Coverage 
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States experienced a signif-
icant economic boom that instigated the exponential development of the in-
frastructure of the American interior.49  Specifically, this economic prosperity 
stimulated the increased development and utilization of the nation’s road-
ways.50  New and improved roads linked previously isolated communities and 
connected Americans in ways never before envisioned.51  The passage of the 
Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1956 furthered this development, as extensive 
funding was allocated to build far-reaching interstate systems that not only 
joined people, but goods, ideas, services, and even American culture.52  In 
addition, the economic prosperity enjoyed by many Americans after the war 
led to increased purchases and acquisitions of automobiles, as accessibility to 
the machines was no longer limited to the affluent.53  As a result, by the mid-
1950s, Americans were loading up their vehicles and entering the roadways 
in unprecedented numbers.54 
As the number of motorists grew, the amount and severity of automobile 
accidents correspondingly increased.55  The 1960s in particular saw the num-
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Overview of the Post-War Era, DIGITAL HISTORY (2014), 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/era.cfm?eraID=16 (last visited June 22, 2015). 
 50. Ralph P. Higgins, Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage Laws: The Problem of 
the Underinsured Motorist, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 541, 541 (1980). 
 51. Harvey K. Flad, Country Clutter: Visual Pollution and the Rural Landscape, 
553 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 117, 120 (1997). 
 52. Richard F. Weingroff, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956: Creating the Inter-
state System, PUBLIC ROADS (Summer 1996), http://www.fhwa.dot. gov/publications 
/publicroads/96summer/p96su10.cfm; MARK H. ROSE, INTERSTATE: EXPRESS 
HIGHWAY POLITICS, 1939–1989 101 (rev. ed. 1990).  See generally History and Cul-
tural Impact of the Interstate Highway System, LANDSCAPE CHANGE PROGRAM, 
http://www.uvm.edu/landscape/learn/impact_of_interstate_system.html (last visited 
June 22, 2015). 
 53. Transportation: Past, Present and Future, THE HENRY FORD 1, 56 (2011), 
http://www.thehenryford.org/education/erb/TransportationPastPresentAndFuture.pdf. 
 54. See, e.g., An Analysis of the Significant Decline in Motor Vehicle Traffic 
Fatalities in 2008, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. at *31 (June 2010), 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811346.pdf; see also JOHN HEITMANN, THE 
AUTOMOBILE AND THE AMERICAN LIFE 133 (2009) (declaring the 1950s as the golden 
age of the automobile in United States, and that this machine altered American culture 
during that decade in ways unprecedented by the other technologies of its day). 
 55. HEITMANN, supra note 54, at 144. 
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ber and visibility of fatal car crashes increase at an alarming rate.56  Many of 
those involved in these serious accidents were uninsured, and drivers seeking 
to recover damages in court consistently experienced difficulties in enforcing 
their judgments.57  Often, the liable party would be unable to meet the de-
mands of the decision and could not satisfy the outstanding judgment.58  As a 
result, the injured party would receive very little compensation and would 
often be forced to cover its own losses. 
Thus, due to the increased number of accidents on American roads fol-
lowing World War II, policies that included UM coverage emerged in the 
1950s.59  Initially, these provisions were strictly voluntary, as concerned ob-
servers hoped that market pressures would result in most insurance contracts 
adopting UM policies.60  However, this wish was left largely unfulfilled, as 
very few insurance contracts that included UM coverage were implemented.61  
In response, many state legislatures began adopting compulsory UM insur-
ance statutes62 that imposed varying minimum coverage limits.63  Most states 
by the 1970s had passed some sort of law mandating that insurers cover inju-
ries resulting from uninsured motorists.64  Currently, forty-nine states have 
passed legislation requiring UM coverage.65 
 
 56. An Analysis of the Significant Decline in Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities in 
2008, U.S. DEP’T TRASNP. 1, 27 (June 2010), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/ 
811346.pdf. 
 57. Higgins, supra note 50. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 542. 
 60. Jeffrey E. Thomas, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, 6 
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW § 65.01 (2015). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Some states also passed legislation requiring policies to include underinsured 
motorist coverage (“UIM coverage”) in addition to UM coverage.  See KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-284(b) (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-6408 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 
§ 941(a) (2005).  UIM coverage compensates insured drivers for injuries that they 
sustain as a result of acts committed by drivers who have insurance, but the policy 
limits of the negligent drivers’ policies will not fully compensate the insured driver 
for his or her loss.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-6406 (1994).  Furthermore, UIM coverage is 
often defined to necessarily exclude coverage in circumstances where the negligent 
driver is uninsured.  Id. 
 63. See Assembly Votes Car Law Change, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1957, at 28, 
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.mul.missouri.edu/docview /114019065/ 
23A6B18134454D6FPQ/11?accountid=14576 (describing contested New York legis-
lation that planned to account for uninsured drivers by requiring that all insurance 
premiums allocate a small percentage of its payments to a central fund that would 
disperse to victims of accidents with uninsured motorists). 
 64. David W. Reynolds, Comment, Modernizing Underinsured Motorist Cover-
age in Missouri: Removing the Insurance Paradox Between Uninsured and Underin-
sured Coverage Via Legislative Action, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1049, 1053 (2013). 
 65. Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST. (July 31, 2013), 
www.iii.org/issue-updalte/compulsory-auto-uninsured-motorists. 
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B.  UM Coverage in Missouri 
Missouri ratified its UM coverage bill in 1967 with the passage of Mis-
souri Revised Statutes Section 379.203,66 designated with the purpose of “es-
tablish[ing] a level of protection equivalent to liability coverage an insured 
would have received if the insured had been involved in an accident with an 
insured tort-feasor.”67  Over time, Missouri courts have rejected various chal-
lenges to the statute by insurance companies attempting to void or limit UM 
coverage in their respective policies.68  In Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Madden, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that public policy dictates that 
insurance companies cannot prevent the insured recovery from multiple UM 
coverage policies on separate automobiles.69  Thus, an insured who experi-
enced an injury for which an uninsured motorist was liable could elect to 
recover from each policy that the insured had in effect at the time, rather than 
recovery being limited to collection from only one of the policies.  In effect, 
this decision allowed the “stacking”70 of coverage for the insured when he or 
she has multiple polices covering the same sustained injury. 
In Galloway v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc., the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals for the Kansas City District also elected to extend coverage under the 
UM statute by allowing the plaintiff to stack two different claims from differ-
ent policies.71  The plaintiff in this case had two separate policies for two 
different vehicles that each contained a UM provision to insure the plaintiff in 
the event of an injury resulting from the acts of an uninsured motorist.72  
While driving one of the insured vehicles, the plaintiff was struck by an unin-
sured driver.73  The plaintiff subsequently sued for the upper limit of both 
policy provisions, arguing that he should be allowed to stack the policies de-
spite express provisions in the insurance contract that dictated otherwise.74  
 
 66. Reynolds, supra note 64. 
 67. Hollis v. Blevins, 927 S.W.2d 558, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 68. See Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538, 545 (Mo. 1976) (en 
banc). 
 69. Id. at 544–45. 
 70. In this situation, stacking occurs when the insured has multiple policies that 
provide coverage for the same injury. In situations involving automobiles, the issue of 
stacking often happens when the insured owns multiple cars and maintains coverage 
for each vehicle by paying separate premiums. In these cases, questions often arise if 
the insured should be able to invoke the applicable UM provisions in each policy to 
recover for the injury sustained. Most courts have decided in favor of doing so.  See 
generally David M. Peterson, Comment, Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 
49 MO. L. REV. 580 (1984).  However, there exists some case law to the contrary.  See 
Bruder v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1993). 
 71. 523 S.W.2d 339, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
 72. Id. at 340. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  The contract in question contained an “other insurance” provision that 
limited recovery to only one policy when the insured had other insurance, and recov-
9
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The plaintiff argued that the clauses limiting the UM statute to recovery on 
only one policy in order to prevent stacking should be unenforceable as a 
matter of public policy, as the clauses violated the intent of the legislature in 
seeking to protect drivers who are harmed by uninsured motorists.75 
Ultimately, the court of appeals found the provisions unenforceable, as 
the provisions expressly limited recovery from only one policy when the in-
sured also held other UM insurance issued by the same company.76  The court 
determined that Missouri law had expressly prohibited provisions limiting 
recovery to only one policy when the insured had UM insurance from at least 
one other insurance company.77  As a result, the court found that “[p]ublic 
policy requires that coverage in the statutory amount under each of the poli-
cies stand undiminished by contractual limitation, regardless of whether the 
policies are issued by the same or different insurers.”78  Thus, the court struck 
down the limiting provisions in the insurance contract and extended the scope 
of the UM statute to allow stacking of multiple UM policies. 
Another important decision that expounded on the scope and parameter 
of the UM statute was the decision in Bergtholdt v. Farmers Insurance Co., 
Inc.79  The plaintiff in this case was a passenger in a vehicle that collided with 
an intoxicated motorist.80  The accident left the plaintiff and her unborn child 
permanently injured, and her husband and two children died as a result of the 
injuries sustained in the accident.81  The plaintiff owned two insurance poli-
cies at the time of the accident, each covering one of the two vehicles that the 
family owned.82  Additionally, the intoxicated motorist maintained liability 
coverage.83  Each of these policies included a provision for UM coverage and 
were capped at the statutory minimum required by Missouri law.84  Thus, the 
question was whether the defendant’s liability coverage precluded application 
of the UM coverage and if it did not, whether the two separate policies could 
be stacked under the circumstances at hand.85 
After analyzing Missouri precedent, the court in Bergtholdt declared 
that public policy “mandates that when an insured has two separate policies 
containing uninsured motorist clauses, effect shall be given to both coverages 
without reduction or limitation by policy provisions, and that both coverages 
 
ery from the other insurance policy in addition to the amount sought under the pend-
ing claim would exceed the policy limits of the contract at issue.  Id. 
 75. Id. at 340–41. 
 76. Id. at 343. 
 77. Id. at 341 (citing Gordon v. Maupin, 469 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1971) and Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins. Co., 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)). 
 78. Id. at 343. 
 79. 691 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
 80. Id. at 358. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 359. 
 84. Id. at 358–59. 
 85. Id. at 359. 
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are available to those insured thereby.”86  Furthermore, the court made a de-
termination that, due to the peculiarity of the language contained in the UM 
provision in these particular policies, the plaintiff was not precluded from 
recovery thereunder purely as a result of the defendant’s status as an in-
sured.87  Thus, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover for the maximum 
limits of the UM coverage, minus money already received via settlement of 
the plaintiff’s other outstanding claims.88 
In contrast, the 1996 case of Livingston v. Omaha Property and Casual-
ty Insurance Co.89 provided a limit to the scope of UM coverage in Missouri 
with regard to wrongful death actions.90  In Livingston, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Western District established that in wrongful death actions, 
the party seeking to recover under the policy’s UM coverage does so from the 
standpoint of the victim who suffered the physical injuries, rather than on his 
or her own behalf.91  In this lawsuit, the daughter of the plaintiff was a pas-
senger in a vehicle that collided with an uninsured motorist.92  As a result of 
the accident, the daughter sustained substantial injuries and subsequently 
died.93  Both of the cars that were involved in the accident did not have cur-
rent insurance policies, and the plaintiff’s insurance policy did not extend to 
the car her daughter owned.94 
As the insurer refused to cover the loss, the plaintiff filed a wrongful 
death claim in order to recover for damages she sustained as a result of her 
daughter’s death.95  In her claim, the plaintiff asserted that her insurance car-
rier owed her compensation for the emotional injuries she sustained as an 
insured under the UM coverage provision in her insurance policy and that any 
language limiting her ability to recover damages violated the coverage af-
forded by the UM statute when broadly construed.96  However, the court re-
jected her argument, ruling that the exact language of the policy at issue re-
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 359–60.  In the policy at issue, an uninsured under the policy was de-
fined “to include a motor vehicle where there is bodily injury liability insurance or an 
applicable bond at the time of accident, but in amounts less than the limits carried by 
the insured under Uninsured Motorist Coverage.” Id. at 360. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 927 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 90. For other Missouri cases limiting the extension of UM coverage because of 
the specific policy language and definitions, see Famuliner v. Farmers Insurance Co., 
Inc., 619 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) and Elder v. Metropolitan Property & 
Casualty Co., 851 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 91. Livingston, 927 S.W.2d at 445. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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quired that a named insured sustain the bodily injury resulting from an acci-
dent with an uninsured motorist.97 
Thus, the court found that one who suffers the injury, as defined by the 
policy, must be a named insured, and policy provisions requiring this are not 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy, as these provisions are consistent 
with the intent of the legislature in passing Section 379.203.98  The court 
therefore determined that the UM statute should not be construed to allow 
recovery by an insured under the UM provision when the policyholder files a 
wrongful death action on behalf of a decedent non-insured.99 
However, in the 2009 case of Derousse v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Missouri distinguished the reason-
ing in this case from that in Livingston by allowing an insured to recover for 
emotional damages that were sustained in a collision with an uninsured mo-
torist.100  In Derousse, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident 
where a body was ejected from an uninsured vehicle and landed forcefully on 
the hood of her car.101  The body subsequently slid off the hood of the auto-
mobile, and rolled under the car.102  Unfortunately, the plaintiff recognized 
the decedent when she saw the body lying by her driver’s side door.103 
As a result of this accident, the plaintiff experienced severe emotional 
distress and sought coverage from her insurance company to compensate her 
for her damages.104  In denying her claim, the insurance company cited policy 
language in the UM coverage provision that excluded from coverage any 
damage that was not a bodily injury.105  In resolving the dispute, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri determined that the UM statute demanded coverage for 
bodily injuries, sickness, or disease, and that such sickness or disease could 
be interpreted to include emotional distress.106  Because the court determined 
that the UM statute requires coverage for sickness and disease, it voided the 
provision in the insurance contract limiting damage strictly to bodily inju-
ries.107  Therefore, the court seemed to mandate that UM coverage necessarily 
extend to compensate insureds for emotional damages sustained as a result of 
accidents caused by uninsured motorists, and any policy language to the con-
trary is void as a matter of law. 
In the midst of this murky case law, the instant case was decided.  The 
court in Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter108 was asked to consider whether to permit 
 
 97. Id. at 446. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 298 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 895. 
 107. Id. 
 108. 439 S.W.3d 215 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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the stacking of the UM coverage provisions to the full amount offered by the 
policy.  In order to do so, the court also evaluated the propriety of allowing 
the plaintiff to recover in cases in which the decedent and the one seeking to 
recover on his or her behalf are both insureds, and where the non-decedent 
insured seeks to recover personal damages sustained for the death of another 
person. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Floyd-Tunnell, the Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately enforced 
the owned-vehicle exclusion by determining that UM coverage does not ex-
tend to emotional injuries sustained by the insured as a result of the wrongful 
death of others, even if the other person also qualified as an insured under the 
same insurance contract.109  The court stated that the insurance policy con-
tained a severability clause and therefore, the contract should be read by in-
serting the insured plaintiff’s name into the policy whenever there was any 
reference to the insured in the agreement.110  In implementing this strategy, 
the court interpreted the contract to assert that the plaintiff would be afforded 
coverage for money owed as a result of bodily injury sustained by the plain-
tiff that was caused by an uninsured motorist.111  Because Mrs. Floyd did not 
sustain bodily injury as defined by the terms of the policy,112 the court ruled 
that she was barred from recovering for any emotional damages she personal-
ly suffered as a result of her husband’s death. 
Thus, the court determined that the only way Mrs. Floyd could recover 
for any injuries caused by the death of her husband was through the position 
of the decedent, Mr. Floyd, and the decedent clearly fit into the owned-
vehicle exclusion, as he was driving a different car than the automobiles pro-
tected by the policies covering the Camry and Silverado, respectively.113  The 
court also ruled that the specific language of the owned-vehicle exclusion was 
not ambiguous or vague, as a policyholder reading the contract as a whole 
would understand the provision to expressly limit coverage to $25,000 if the 
insured was injured while operating or driving a vehicle that was not covered 
by the policy, but still owned by the insured.114  Therefore, with regard to 
those two policies, the court determined that the decedent was limited to re-
cover only the statutory minimum of $25,000 per policy.115  Yet, the court 
 
 109. Id. at 219–21. 
 110. Id. at 219. 
 111. Id. 
 112. The policy described bodily injury as follows: “(a) A physical injury; (b) A 
sickness or disease of the body; (c) The physical pain and physical suffering that 
directly results from (a) or (b), above; or (d) A death that directly results from (a) or 
(b), above.”  Id. at 218. 
 113. Id. at 220–21. 
 114. Id. at 221. 
 115. Id. 
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allowed Mrs. Floyd to stack the three policies to receive a total of $150,000116 
in UM coverage from the three separate automobile policies.  Finally, the 
court determined that it would be beyond the scope the legislature originally 
envisioned to extend the requirements of the UM statute to include “coverage 
for damages sustained by an insured as a result of the wrongful death of an-
other person,” and that it would be unreasonable to mandate such coverage 
without the express demand of the legislature to do so.117 
The dissent, on the other hand, disagreed with the decision that Mrs. 
Floyd would not be able to recover under the UM statute for injuries she per-
sonally received as the result of the death of her husband.118  The dissent 
found that Mrs. Floyd suffered grievous injuries because of the conduct of the 
uninsured motorist.  Specifically, Mrs. Floyd suffered such damages as the 
loss of consortium, loss of economic support, suffering, and loss of compan-
ionship.119  For the dissent, the majority’s interpretation that she could not 
recover on her own behalf would be contrary to the plain language of the 
Missouri UM statute.  The statute requires that UM coverage provide “for the 
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of . . 
. death.”120 
Because Mrs. Floyd, the plaintiff, can recover for her injuries on her 
own behalf rather than merely as a beneficiary of her husband’s estate, the 
dissent argued that the owned-vehicle exclusion does not apply to her.121  The 
dissent further argued that the exclusion does not apply because Mrs. Floyd 
was not operating or driving a vehicle owned but not insured by the specific 
policy at the time of the accident and the loss.122  Thus, the dissent found that 
the provision was not applicable, and that the insured, Mrs. Floyd, should be 
able to recover the full $100,000 limit from which she qualified under the 
UM provision contained therein.123 
In making this determination, the two-judge dissent noted that, when 
ambiguous, the insurance policy must be read from the position and under-
standing of an average reader, with any unclear or vague terms being con-
strued against the drafter.124  Because the policy in this case was unclear at 
best, and because Mrs. Floyd suffered real and tangible personal injuries, the 
 
 116. The plaintiff was allowed to recover $25,000 each from the Camry and Sil-
verado policies, as well as $100,000 from the policy of the vehicle driven by Mr. 
Floyd at the time of the accident.  Id. at 217.  The total award for the plaintiff totaled 
$150,000.  Id. 
 117. Id. at 220. 
 118. Id. at 222 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. 
 120. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203.1 (2000). 
 121. Floyd-Tunnell¸ 439 S.W.3d at 223 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (citing Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc)). 
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dissent found full recovery possible under its construction and interpretation 
of the UM provision of the insurance contract.125 
V.  COMMENT 
There are many important consequences of the court’s decision and rea-
soning in favor of the insurer in this case.  However, this Part will focus on 
the four most important aspects of the decision.  First, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri decided to follow the basic reasoning applied in Livingston, which 
rejected an interpretation of bodily injury that would encompass injuries sus-
tained by an insured who was attempting to recover under the wrongful death 
statute.  The second notable consequence is the rejection of the dissent’s in-
terpretation of the confluence of Missouri’s wrongful death and UM statutes, 
including its application of the rationale employed in Derousse.  The third 
significant outcome is that the court upheld the owned-vehicle exclusion as it 
was defined in the policy, and in so doing offers insurers a useful exclusion to 
utilize in decreasing the total policy limits under the UM provisions in their 
policies.  The fourth major consequence is that it will further complicate at-
tempts by insurers and insureds to determine the proper scope and nature of 
the coverage afforded by their insurance contract in the future. 
A.  Affirming the UM Emotional Recovery Bar as Established by    
Livingston 
One of the most important aspects of the decision is the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s decision to extend the same basic reasoning from Livingston v. 
Omaha Property and Casualty Insurance Co. to the circumstances of the case 
before the court.  In Livingston, the insured sued for emotional and psycho-
logical damages she experienced as a result of the wrongful death of her un-
insured daughter who died in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist.126  
The insured argued that she still sustained emotional injuries from the acci-
dent, and any provision in the contract preventing her ability to recover for all 
losses sustained as a result of the accident should be unenforceable, as it 
would be inconsistent with the purpose of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 
379.203.1.127  This argument is made possible by the fact that protection 
against injuries sustained by the actions of uninsured motorists, unlike liabil-
ity insurance, “does not inure with a particular motor vehicle.”128  Thus, UM 
 
 125. Id. (majority opinion). 
 126. Livingston v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Stephen R. Bough and M. Blake Heath, Current Issues in Underinsured   
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coverage will, in theory, cover any losses sustained by the insured, irrespec-
tive of whether the insured was a pedestrian, operating a different vehicle 
from the one named under the policy, or was a passenger in a vehicle un-
named under the policy.129 
However, the court in Livingston, like the Supreme Court of Missouri in 
Floyd-Tunnell, declined to allow the plaintiff to recover for injuries and the 
death of the third party.130  In so deciding, the court stated that “to accept 
plaintiff’s interpretation, would permit plaintiff to recover under her unin-
sured motorist policy for the death of any person from whom she is legally 
entitled to bring a claim under the wrongful death statute.”131  This outcome, 
the court contended, was not contemplated by the legislature as they likely 
envisioned that the survivors of the decedent would file a claim under the 
decedent’s policy rather than on their own behalf.132  Thus, the court con-
cluded, “[W]hile uninsured motorists coverage is to be given a liberal inter-
pretation, coverage should not be created where there is none.”133 
The Livingston decision, however, could be easily distinguished from 
the facts of Floyd-Tunnell.  In Floyd-Tunnell, the decedent is insured by the 
policy at issue, whereas the decedent in Livingston was not.134  Thus, the sur-
vivors of the decedent were seeking to recover from the decedent’s own poli-
cy, which also was the same policy issued to the survivors.135  As a result, the 
claimant is not seeking to recover for just any person that he or she is legally 
entitled to recover, but rather a co-insured on the same policy. 
However, the Floyd-Tunnell court rejected this distinction and chose to 
limit recovery in cases where the insured is seeking recovery because he or 
she is entitled to do so under the state’s applicable wrongful death statute, 
rather than choosing to allow recuperation for the losses sustained by the 
insured on his or her own behalf.136  In stating that mandatory UM coverage 
under the Missouri UM statute “does not include coverage for damages sus-
tained by an insured a result of the wrongful death of another person,”137 the 
Floyd-Tunnell court determined that “[i]t would be unreasonable to interpret 
[this statute] to require every automobile liability insurance policy to provide 
coverage for damages its insureds are legally entitled to recover for the 
wrongful death of another person.”138 
 
 129. See id. 
 130. Livingston, 927 S.W.2d at 446. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., No. WD 75725, 2013 WL 5978452, 
at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2013). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 220–21 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss3/14
2015] A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNELL? 937 
Although, by this reasoning, the Floyd-Tunnell court, like the Livingston 
court, ignored the exact language of the statute that specifically allows recov-
ery for those insureds “who are legally entitled to recover damages.”139  As 
the statutorily defined claimant under the wrongful death statute, these in-
sureds are legally entitled to recover damages, and thus, the UM statute 
would seemingly demand their inclusion under UM coverage, especially if 
the statute is broadly construed.140  Because Missouri courts tend to broadly 
construe the extent and scope of UM coverage,141 this rejection of the in-
sureds’ ability to recover for damages that they are legally entitled to is diffi-
cult to reconcile with existing case law.  Ultimately, however, the court im-
plicitly extended the decision in Livingston to apply to cases where the person 
who suffered the injury is a decedent co-insured, and rejected a strong argu-
ment to deviate from Livingston and its ilk142 as the decedent was a co-
insured and the statute seems to suggest recovery under these circumstanc-
es.143  Without the passage of any legislation to the contrary, it appears that 
an insured will always be precluded from seeking to recover on his or her 
own behalf for injuries sustained by a decedent.144 
B.  Rejection of the Derousse Decision by Barring Emotional Damages 
In addition to reaffirming cases like Livingston, another important as-
pect of the decision in Floyd-Tunnell is the rejection of the dissent’s interpre-
tation of recovery under Missouri’s wrongful death statute, which coincides 
with the court’s previous decision in Derousse.145  In his dissent, Judge Rich-
ard B. Teitelman stated that the insured at issue in this case, Mrs. Floyd, did 
not sustain a physical injury directly inflicted by the accident between her 
husband and the uninsured motorist.146  However, Mrs. Floyd was severely 
injured in other ways by the death of her husband as a result of the fatal acci-
dent for which her husband bore no fault.147  Mrs. Floyd’s claim for injury 
 
 139. Id. at 219–20. 
 140. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203.5 (2000). 
 141. Id. § 379.203.1. 
 142. See Famuliner v. Farmers Ins. Co., 619 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); 
Elder v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Co., 851 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 143. Floyd-Tunnell¸439 S.W.3d at 216–17. 
 144. Although limiting recovery in this manner may not be a bad policy overall, it 
still would be beneficial if the statute could be amended to clarify this issue.  If in-
sureds were allowed to recover on their own behalf for any damages to which they are 
legally entitled, as the statute seems to suggest, then this would cause insurers to raise 
the prices and rates of insurance premiums and policies, as insurers would be required 
to assume a significant increase in the amount of risk that they are insuring against 
under the policies. 
 145. Id. at 220; Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 895 
(Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 146. Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 222 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. 
17
Wittrig: A Light at the End of the Tunnell?
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
938 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
through the wrongful death action was, therefore, a “separate and distinct 
claim allowing her to recover damages for items such as loss of consortium, 
companionship and economic support.”148  Thus, for the dissent, Mrs. Floyd 
was the relevant insured to consider when evaluating the nature and extent of 
the loss.149 
Furthermore, the dissent contended that the majority’s belief that Mrs. 
Floyd did not herself sustain any “bodily injuries” as demanded by the UM 
statute150 ignored the fact that in a wrongful death case, the insured seeking to 
recover for injuries sustained will never be the one who sustained the bodily 
injuries.151  Additionally, such an interpretation of the nature of the injuries 
sustained by the insured ignores the court’s reasoning employed in Derousse, 
where the court found recoverable under the UM statute certain emotional 
injuries that occurred as a result of the accident with the uninsured motor-
ist.152  Thus, the dissent argued that wrongful death claims cannot be filed 
under the policies at issue if one strictly employs the definitions of the ma-
jority, and that such an interpretation of all of the policies of this nature 
would render them unenforceable as against both the statute and against pub-
lic policy.153 
The rejection of the argument proffered by the dissent has a few practi-
cal consequences.  First, the decision preserves the status quo in that it con-
tinues to bar statutory wrongful death claimants from recovery for their own 
non-physical damages under the UM provisions in their auto policies.  The 
decision further reaffirms the ability of surviving insureds to recover on be-
half of the decedent insured, but precludes the survivors from also asserting 
claims on their own behalf due to a lack of bodily injury.154  Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the majority avoids invalidating many existing policies that 
are based upon the insurer’s understanding of the applicability of the wrong-
ful death statute to such claims. 
The rejection of the dissent’s argument by the majority may also predict 
future limitations on recovery by those seeking damages under UM provi-
sions to a more strict definition of bodily injuries than had been previously 
employed by Missouri courts in decisions such as Derousse.155  By stating 
 
 148. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Mo. 2009) (en 
banc)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (2000). 
 151. Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 222 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 152. Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 153. Id. at 896.  In particular, the reasoning would violate Section 379.203.1, 
which provides “that a policy for automobile liability coverage can only be issued if 
the coverage provides “for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legal-
ly entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles 
because of . . . death.”  § 379.203. 
 154. Floyd-Tunnell¸439 S.W.3d at 221 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
 155. Derousse, 298 S.W.3d at 895. 
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that Mrs. Floyd did not sustain any covered injuries, the court allows for the 
exclusion from UM coverage of damages based on emotional suffering, men-
tal anguish, loss of companionship, and more intangible injuries sustained in 
the accident.156  Although many contracts already equate bodily injury with 
physical injury, decisions such as the opinion rendered in this case could be 
used to support a very strict definition of what constitutes a recoverable inju-
ry.  Thus, cases like Floyd-Tunnell could possibly be used to justify the ex-
clusion of monetary or emotional injuries on a claim brought under the UM 
provision of the policy at issue.  Such a result would seem to militate against 
the express purpose of the UM statute to provide adequate relief to insureds 
who suffer from damages caused by uninsured motorists. 
C.  Importance of the Owned-Vehicle Exclusion 
Another significant ramification of Floyd-Tunnell is that the decision 
upheld the owned-vehicle exclusion.  The owned-vehicle exclusion limited 
recovery to the statutory minimum if the insured who suffered damages was 
operating a vehicle that was owned by the insured, but not covered under the 
policy at issue.157  By enforcing this provision, it appears that insurers in the 
future will be able to limit the full consequences of stacking by limiting the 
application of other policies to only the statutory minimum via the owned-
vehicle exclusion.  Thus, insureds who pay premiums on multiple policies, 
each including UM coverage by law, will continue to be unable to reap the 
full coverage limits of such policies if there exists an owned-vehicle exclu-
sion in their policies.  Instead, this exclusion will limit recovery under all 
policies except those covering the car the driver was operating at the time of 
the accident.158  Therefore, recognition of the validity of such provisions 
seems to militate against public policy in favor of stacking, which Missouri 
courts have long recognized with respect to UM coverage.159  Although tech-
nically the insured can bargain out of any agreement that contains any owned-
vehicle exclusions, the practical effect of decisions that find enforceable such 
clauses will be to reinforce the use of these provisions in UM coverage and 
will largely limit the gains secured by insureds in litigation over stacking. 
 
 156. Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 220 (majority opinion). 
 157. Id. at 220–21. 
 158. For an interesting discussion regarding the enforceability of Drive-Other-Car 
exclusions under the Wisconsin state UM statute, see Michael J. Certak, Kasdorf, 
Lewis, & Swietlik, The Enforceability of the Drive-Other-Car Exclusion in Light of 




 159. See Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Madden, 533 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1976) (en 
banc); Galloway v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
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D.  Clarifying the Scope of UM Coverage in Policies 
One final aspect to consider when weighing the effectiveness of the 
court’s decision in Floyd-Tunnell is to contemplate the opinion in the context 
of current driving realities.  As previously mentioned, one in seven drivers 
are allegedly uninsured, and many of these drivers are involved in severe car 
accidents.160  Thus, the provisions of UM coverage often have a substantial 
effect on the possible amount and nature of recovery for the claimant.  On the 
one hand, Floyd-Tunnell probably departs from the expectations of the nor-
mal insurance purchaser.  The average insured pays three separate, not insig-
nificant, premiums for three separate polices that each individually have a 
substantial upper limit for UM coverage.  Upon an accident involving an un-
insured motorist for which the damages sustained by the insured exceed poli-
cy limits, it seems likely that the insurance purchaser would assume that the 
upper limit of each distinct policy would apply, and help them recuperate 
some portion of his or her loss.  Furthermore, the purchaser would expect to 
be compensated for all losses sustained, rather than be constrained by the 
degree the injury is related to the definition of “bodily injury” as established 
by the policy. 
On the other hand, with insurance purchasers often owning multiple cars 
and buying the required UM coverage for each policy, insurance companies 
can incur substantial losses if the full amount of such policies are allowed to 
stack, and all types of damages are included in the claim.  If such exclusions 
or limitations on the definition of who qualifies as an insured and what types 
of losses are insurable were not allowed as unenforceable as against public 
policy, the cost of insuring the mandatory UM coverage would rise.  As a 
result, this rising cost would likely be passed on to the insurance purchaser 
through a variety of mechanisms which would at least include increased pre-
miums. 
Therefore, the problem of insuring against uninsured drivers compels 
Missouri courts to engage in a very intricate and delicate balancing act.  
These decisions with wide ranging societal implications and costs are never 
easy to determine.  However, opinions like Floyd-Tunnell, need to offer some 
sort of guidance in determining the required extent of the UM statute and the 
concrete parameters of UM coverage.  Acceptable boundaries to UM cover-
age not only protect insurance companies, but also the companies’ insureds 
by keeping the costs of insurance manageable, and gives notice to insureds 
and insurers alike of the extent of the purchased coverage. 
One of the unfortunate aspects of purchasing an insurance contract is 
that often neither the insured nor the insurer knows the precise nature of the 
purchased coverage at the time of the transaction, or whether all the agreed 
upon provisions of the contract are fundamentally acceptable to a court inter-
preting the contested policy.  Additionally, neither the insured nor the insurer 
will know if a court will find the provision void due to ambiguity, as against 
 
 160. Copeland, supra note 14; Uninsured Motorists, surpa note 14. 
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public policy, or some other traditional means of invalidating an unenforcea-
ble clause within the policy.  Although many aspects of the policies through 
continual trial and error are wrought into serviceable provisions by the courts, 
the constantly changing realities and circumstances of insureds and insurers 
render the perfect insurance contract impossible and unattainable.  Therefore, 
decisions like Floyd-Tunnell remain necessary, and continue to help elucidate 
the acceptability of certain provisions under the UM statute, in resolving fu-
ture uncertainties over whether or not coverage even exists in certain situa-
tions, and the amount or nature of compensable damages under the policy at 
issue.  Unfortunately, Floyd-Tunnell does not provide the needed clarification 
of the UM statute,161 and may operate only as another shadow in the murky 
tunnel that is the case law surrounding the UM statute. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Floyd-Tunnell, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the 
co-insured should be prevented from recovering the full amount from the two 
policies at issue as the insurance agreement limited recovery to only the in-
sured that suffered any direct physical injuries from the conduct of the unin-
sured motorist.  As the co-insured plaintiff did not sustain such injuries, but 
was recovering for the wrongful death of the decedent insured, the court 
maintained that she was only able to recover from the position of the dece-
dent.  As a result, the unambiguous owned-vehicle exclusion applied, limiting 
the extent of recovery for two of the three policies. 
In so determining, the Supreme Court of Missouri approved potentially 
significant limitations to UM coverage despite case law to the contrary.  First, 
the court permitted the use of owned-vehicle exclusions in claims involving 
recovery through the wrongful death of another person.  Additionally, the 
court adopted a strict definition of “bodily injury” that precludes wrongful 
death beneficiaries, who are insureds, from recovering for their own intangi-
ble injuries.   Finally, the court failed to ultimately clarify and identify the 
precise nature of the espoused limitations to the seemingly expansive UM 
coverage mandated by the UM statute, and did not resolve conflicting case 
law on the matter.
 
 161. For instance, the decision effectively bars recovery of emotional damages in 
the event of an insured seeking to recover for the wrongful death of another when an 
uninsured motorist is liable for the damages.  See Floyd-Tunnell¸439 S.W.3d at 219.  
However, the decision does not clarify in what situations an insured will be able to 
collect for damages that are not purely bodily injuries under the UM statute.  See id.  
Furthermore, the decision does not clarify what precise coverage and language is 
necessitated by the UM statute in wrongful death cases.  See id. 
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